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Abstract
Background: Since the late 1990s, contracting has been employed in Cambodia in an attempt to accelerate rural
health system recovery and improve health service delivery. Special Operating Agencies (SOA), a form of ‘internal
contracting’, was introduced into selected districts by the Cambodia Ministry of Health in 2009. This study
investigates how the SOA model was implemented and identifies effects on service delivery, challenges in
operation and lessons learned.
Methods: The study was carried out in four districts, using mixed methods. Key informant interviews were
conducted with representatives of donors and the Ministry of Health. In-depth interviews were carried out with
managers of SOA and health facilities and health workers from referral hospitals and health centres. Data from the
Annual Health Statistic Report 2009–2012 on utilisation of antenatal care, delivery and immunisation were analysed.
Results: There are several challenges with implementation: limited capacity and funding for monitoring the SOA,
questionable reliability of the monitoring data, and some facilities face challenges in achieving the targets set in
their contracts. There are some positive effects on staff behaviour which include improved punctuality, being on
call for 24 h service, and perceived better quality of care, promoted through adherence to work regulations
stipulated in the contracts and provision of incentives. However, flexibility in enforcing these regulations in SOA has
led to more dual practice, compared to previous contracting schemes. There are reported increases in utilization of
services by the general population and the poor although the quantitative findings question the extent to which
these increases are attributable to the contracting model.
Conclusion: Capacity in planning and monitoring contracts at different levels in the health system is required.
Service delivery will be undermined if effective performance management is not established nor continuously
applied. Improvements in the implementation of SOA include: better monitoring by the central and provincial
levels; developing incentive schemes that tackle the issues of dual practice; and securing trustworthy baseline data
for performance indicators.
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Background
Globally, public management approaches introducing
market mechanisms into the public sector have been
widely accepted. One such approach is contracting of
health services. Since the late 1990s, Cambodia has
experienced various forms of contracting in the health sec-
tor. From 2009, the contracting model has involved per-
formance incentives and monitoring mechanisms with a
greater level of autonomy for health district management.
This paper aims to provide a better understanding of the
implementation of the contracting model in Cambodia,
which can contribute to the redesign of the performance
based contracting scheme interventions in Cambodia.
Contracting in general
Contracting is a process of fulfilling the conditions as in the
written agreement by two or more parties [1]. It has been
argued that contracting is a potential mechanism to improve
health system performance through enhancing accessibility,
equity, quality and efficiency of health services by creating
collaborations to achieve public health goals [2]. There are
several types of contracting; Table 1 provides an overview.
There are advantages and disadvantages to all forms of
contracting which are dependent upon capacity, environ-
ment and culture in which they are implemented. Several
elements need to be in place for contracting to be imple-
mented successfully including regulatory mechanisms and
their enforcement, alignments of interests, and coherent
policies [3]. Contracting is not a magic bullet with several
challenges exist, including: increased capacity to plan,
manage and monitor the contract, increased costs for con-
tract management and monitoring, and the possible lack
of attention to services outside the contract [3–5]. Despite
these concerns, many countries have adopted contracting
as a tool for improving health service delivery.
Contracting in fragile and post- conflict countries
Contracting has been implemented in fragile and post-
conflict states to increase access to basic primary care
services to a large population or geographically difficult
accessed population [6–8]. Cambodia adopted this mech-
anism to recover health service delivery in the country and
carried out “contracting experiments” between 1999 and
2003 (see next section for more details). In Haiti, during
the late 1990s, supported by USAID, contracts with NGOs
that were partially based on performance were reported to
improve coverage of preventive care [9]. Since then, this
mechanism has been adopted by donors to support other
countries’ health sectors such as Afghanistan, the DRC,
Guatemala, Liberia and Southern Sudan. In Afghanistan,
from 2002, the Ministry of Public Health contracted with
27 NGOs to deliver a basic package of health services in
31 of 34 provinces, and maintained responsibility for ser-
vice delivery in the remaining 3 provinces [10]. The use of
contracting by three major donors increased access to
basic health services from 5% in 2002 to an estimated 77%
in 2006 [11]. However, despite these improvements in ac-
cess to services, a survey showed that inequities in access
to and use of services as well as costs of care continue
with poorer households facing greater barriers [12].
Contracting is not always viewed as the easy option
for governments in fragile states. Several issues have
been raised: formal contracting can be challenging in
settings where political and economic stability cannot be
guaranteed; profound cultural and institutional con-
straints such as social resistance to the involvement of
non-state actors; willingness and/or capacity within the
non-state sector to enter into contractual arrangements;
bidding processes that may erode quality and favour
local cronyism; and performance based contracts may
rule out informal providers who are often the most
important source of health care for poor people [13].
However, in certain settings where reliance on non-state
providers is well established and the capacity of the
government is weak, contracting out service delivery can
represent the only feasible policy option [14].
Contracting in Cambodia
The civil war left Cambodia with a fractured health system:
empty and ruined health facilities and under a hundred
health professionals. With the challenges of few resources,
an international blockade and continued local armed con-
flict, the Ministry of Health tried to reconstruct the health
system. Cambodia opened up to foreign investments follow-
ing the UN sponsored national elections and national unifi-
cation in 1993. International development agencies were
interested in supporting the rehabilitation of the health sys-
tem. Between 1989 and 1995, both the government and do-
nors invested in the health sector, and the first health sector
reform (HSR 1) was implemented between 1991 and 1994.
The second health sector reform followed which included
establishment of the health coverage plan and financing
charter and introduction of user fees at public facilities [15].
Table 1 Overview of different types of contracting
External contracting:
Contracting out
An external service provider is engaged
through a contract to provide services
with maximum control over the resources
and how services should be delivered
External contracting:
Contracting in
An external service provider is brought in
to manage and operate service provision
institutions with some control over
resources and services arrangements
Internal contracting Internal contracting is a form of relational
contracting whereby responsibility is
delegated to peripheral units under the
same legal entity e.g. governments contract
with public providers i.e. with autonomous
institutions which remain under public
ownership
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Since the late 1990s, contracting has been used in
Cambodia in an attempt to accelerate the recovery of the
rural health system and improve health service delivery.
The three major phases of contracting are: 1) the pilot
phase of contracting between 1999 and 2002/3; 2) “hybrid
contracting”; 3) in 2009, Special Operating Agency (SOA),
a form of internal contracting was introduced (Fig. 1).
In phase 1, external contracting operated in five health
districts (out of total of 183 in Cambodia), of which two
districts used “contracting out” and three used “contract-
ing in”. Improvements in maternal and child health ser-
vices were reported - increased coverage of health
services, more equitable provision of care, and reduc-
tions in out of pocket expenditure - but at a cost almost
twice as high as standard districts [16]. There were con-
cerns about how this approach could be sustained and
whether it was affordable. In phase 2 (2004–8), “hybrid
contracting” was introduced in 16 health districts: in 11
health districts international NGOs were contracted to
provide management services to the health districts; and
the five other districts, were contracted by their provin-
cial departments and received funding from the Belgian
Development Agency (BTC). Performance contracts, in-
centives, monitoring mechanisms and capacity develop-
ment of local health management were the main
features of both models [15, 17]. Increased service
utilization, improved transparency and accountability in
management, and improved health worker motivation
were reported, but no rigorous evaluation was
conducted (Keller S et al: Assessment of performance
contracting in Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia,
unpublished; [18]).
In phase 3, “internal contracting” was adopted. Public
service institutions including health districts were trans-
formed into semi-autonomous institutions - SOAs. This
brought about a big shift in management arrangements,
allowing more autonomy for the districts to manage their
resources. Table 2 provides more details about SOA.
Several studies have researched the SOA approach.
Khim and Annear 2013, assessed this approach as a
means for improving the management of district health
services and strengthening service delivery in 2011 [19].
They found that it has the potential to improve service
delivery, provided that: there is a clear understanding of
roles and responsibilities by the contracting parties;
implementation of clear rules and procedures; effective
management of performance; effective monitoring of the
contract; and adequate and timely provision of re-
sources. However, this study was conducted only 1 year
after the start of SOA, was conducted in 2 provinces
only – with three of the four study sites being in one
province, and focused on district, provincial and central
level health managers. Khim et al. also looked at the
factors driving the changes in design, implementation
and scaling up of contracting over the period 1997 to
2015. They found that these changes reflected a broader
process of economic and social development in Cambodia
[20]. The government has endorsed the SOA contracting
approach and will move to national coverage in the fore-
seeable future. However, contracting governance mecha-
nisms need to be strengthened. Others have investigated
utilisation of services through a household survey in 8 dis-
tricts, four of which were SOAs, and found that utilization
of public health facilities for outpatient visits was higher in
Fig. 1 Evolution of contracting health services in Cambodia
1SOA status does exist. However, the Service Delivery Grant for SOA is re-designed and scale up across Cambodia, including the non-SOA districts
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SOAs than in non-SOAs (World Bank: Cambodia's rural
health markets. Human Development Unit & East Asia and
Pacific Region: World Bank, unpublished). Basic infrastruc-
ture in health centres and health posts (such as the presence
of a fridge or sterilizers) was better in SOAs and dual prac-
tice was 25% less frequent but vaccination coverage was
lower in SOAs for all vaccines. However, the study was not
explicitly designed to measure the impact of SOAs nor con-
trol for other interventions that may have been imple-
mented in non-SOA districts (e.g., vouchers for maternal
health). The authors recommended a more robust moni-
toring and impact evaluation of the performance of SOAs.
A recent study investigated the effects of contracting on
utilization of maternal and child health services from 1998
to 2010, but did not include the SOA phase [21].
There has been little research done on how the SOA
model has been implemented. There is therefore a need to
understand how this contracting model has been imple-
mented over the 5 years and derive lessons learned from im-
plementation to inform any next steps. The study builds on
Khim and Annear’s study 2013, but draws upon a wider
range of districts and perspectives, as well as exploring a lon-
ger period of implementation of the SOA model. The aim of
this study is therefore to investigate how the internal con-
tracting model has been implemented, identify challenges,
effects on service delivery and provide lessons learned.
Methods
Study design and site
A mixed method study was employed. Qualitative
methodology, comprising key informant interviews with
government and donor representatives and in-depth inter-
views with managers and health workers, was used to enable
direct engagement with the participants and thereby to fa-
cilitate an exploration of their views and experiences of con-
tracting. Secondary data from the Annual Health Statistics
Report was analysed to identify trends in service utilisation.
The study was conducted in four operational districts
(OD). These districts were selected because: they were in dif-
ferent areas of the country; they had a range of experience of
previous contracting models; they were currently operating
as a SOA; and they had a range of services covered by SOA.
In Table 3, information about each district is provided.
Qualitative methods
All interviews were conducted by the research team com-
prising a Cambodian social scientist and research assistant.
Topic guides were developed for each type of interview using
the government’s SOA manual and published literature.
Key informant interviews
Between August and November 2013, 12 key informant
interviews were conducted. The key informants included:
representatives of the Health Sector Support Project 2 and
Table 2 Special Operating Agency
What is a Special
Operating Agency?
Special Operating Agency (SOA) is a
supply-side oriented mechanism
developed from contracting and
implemented by the Cambodian
government through the use of
government staff as contractors to
improve the quality of health care
services for people, mainly the poor
and vulnerable.
How does it operate? In each Operational District (OD) there
are government guidelines for the
delivery of the Minimum Package of
Activities and Complementary Package
of Activities. The SOA is given a degree
of autonomy in making decisions about
the best use of their human, physical and
financial resources to deliver the highest
possible quality of services, in the most
effective way and to enhance performance
and accountability through streamlining
administration to be more transparent and
responsive to people’s needs. The SOAs are
able to hire additional workforce, conduct
performance monitoring and evaluation,
and provide performance incentives. With
the conditions set in the contract and
penalties involved in underperformance
at SOAs, contract monitoring at these
ODs takes place more rigorously and
with clear criteria for determining level
of performance, a feature not usually
seen in standard ODs.
Sources of budget
for SOA
A standard OD has two major income
streams: the government budget and
user fees. SOAs have these plus a
package of budget from the Health
Sector Support Program in the form
of a Service Delivery Grant (SDG). This
additional budget (approximately 40%
of the total budget managed by ODs)
is mainly used for performance monitoring
and incentives. The Ministry of Health (MOH)
signs a performance agreement with the
Provincial Health Department (PHD), and
the PHD in turn signs a services delivery
management contract with the SOA.
Role of MoH and PHD The MOH is responsible for timely allocation
of funds, provision of policies and guidelines,
and enforcement of health legislation,
professional ethics and codes of conduct to
PHD. The PHD takes responsibilities for
providing SOA with financial resources and
assistance in human resources and
performance management. Under the service
delivery management contract, the SOA is
responsible for ensuring the management
of resources at all facilities. The PHD
conducts monitoring of the SOA, usually
on joint monitoring visits with the HSSP
monitoring team. The HSSP monitoring
team includes an external agency.
Extent of SOA operation Thirty SOAs were established by the end
of 2010 and six more SOAs were
introduced by 2013.
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the Ministry of Health (n = 4); representatives from AfD,
World Bank, URC, Unicef, UNFPA, BTC, CARE and
AusAid (n = 8). These interviews explored the key infor-
mants’ perceptions and experiences of SOA implementa-
tion, challenges and advantages of SOA implementation,
and effects on service utilization.
In depth interview with managers and health workers
Twenty-seven interviews were conducted with: SOA
managers in the Provincial Health Department and the
OD; managers of the selected health center and the re-
ferral hospital in each district; and health workers (one
nurse/ midwife and one doctor from the referral hos-
pital; and one nurse/ midwife from the selected health
centre). These interviews explored their views on how
SOA has been implemented including the challenges
and their coping mechanisms, benefits of SOA, effects
of SOA on health system performance including service
utilization, and continuation and scaling-up of SOA.
Data analysis
All recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim into
Khmer. They were then translated into English and
assessed for accuracy against the Khmer transcript and
the recording. Where recording of interviews was de-
clined (n = 2), detailed notes were developed into elec-
tronic documents in English. Using the framework
approach, the research team (comprising of Cambodia
social scientist and research assistant, and UK social sci-
entist) analysed the data. This approach promotes trans-
parent and rigorous analysis [22]. The team read the
transcripts and identified emerging themes, which they
used to develop a coding framework. The team coded all
the transcripts with this framework. The team then devel-
oped charts for all themes and created narratives that
described similar and divergent perceptions, and devel-
oped explanations and find associations between them.
Secondary quantitative data
The research team collected data on immunization,
antenatal care, deliveries by skilled birth attendant and
deliveries at health facilities from the Annual Health
Statistic report (2009 to 2012) for the four provinces
which include the study districts. This data were ana-
lysed to describe the trends in coverage for these indica-
tors from 2009 to 2012. We compared coverage between
contracting (SOA) and non-contracting (non-SOA)
districts in response to the priori hypothesis that SOA
districts should perform better than non-SOA districts
(and the province average).
Results
The results are presented using a framework (Fig. 2)
which has been adapted from two studies that evaluated
contracting schemes to [23, 24]. We have adapted the
framework so that it fits with the overall aims of SOA.
The components of the adapted framework include the
reasons for introduction of contracting, key features of
Table 3 Characteristics of the study districts
District (province) SOA Previous contracting Level of service
covered
Geographical area Population/number
of health facilities
Memut (Kampong Cham) Yes (2009) • 1999–2002/3 contracting
out managed by SCA
• 2004–2008 contracting
managed by SCA
Primary and
secondary care
Lower east plateau
bordering Vietnam
135,500
1 referral hospital
10 health centres
Peariang (Prey Veng) Yes (2009) • 1999–2002 contracting-in
managed by Healthnet
International
• 2004–2008 contracting
managed by Healthnet
International
Primary and
secondary care
Central south plains 193,500
1 referral hospital
15 health centres
Samrong (Oddor Meanchey) Yes (2010) • 2005/2006–2009: performance
contract supported by BTC
• 2006–2008: PMG
Primary care only Upper North
Mountainous
219,000
1 referral hospital
23 health centres
Bati (Takeo) Yes (2010) None Primary and secondary care Plain 202,026
1 referral hospital
13 health centres
SCA Save the Children, Australia, BTC Belgian Development Agency, PMG Priority Mission Group
Rationale for
SOA
Key Features of
SOA 
Implications
Health workers'
motivation and
behaviour  
Quality of Care
Utilisation of
services  
Fig. 2 Framework for assessing impact of SOA in Cambodia
(adapted from Mills (1998) & Caltadol and Kielmann (2016))
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the contract design including how it is implemented, the
implications of contacting on health workers’ behaviour,
quality of care, and utilization of services.
Rationale for introduction of SOA
Managers and health workers identified several reasons
for the introduction of SOA including regaining national
and local ownership of the health system, increased local
capacity in managing contract, issues of cost and sustainabil-
ity, and reducing the conflict of interests in private practice.
National and local ownership: Regaining ownership in
managing health system
Local managers reported that they had no authority to
manage the health services in their district or province, in-
cluding allocation of budgets or recruiting and firing staff
under the previous contracting models with NGOs. Man-
agers and health workers explained that they were
employed by the NGOs, and were “pressurized” to work
and follow their rules, and felt little ownership of the local
health system. They reported more freedom and greater
ownership of their health system in the SOA model.
“Ownership!...there was no ownership at that time
because they have managers to manage over us and we
were just their staff...We are staff completely employed by
NGO…It is normal that civil servant now have more
freedom than working with NGO” (Facility chief, Memut).
Local capacity in managing contract
Some managers reported that district and provincial health
managers’ capacity to manage contracts and service delivery
was developed in districts where contracting with NGOs
operated over several years. Working with NGOs helped
develop the competencies of local managers to manage the
health services independently. This experience facilitated
local managers to operate within the SOA. The change to
SOA allowed more opportunity to continue building
capacity of managers within the current health system.
“At that time, we still had limited capacities, we are
not good at budget management. Before that we only
used the government’s budget which was only small
amount...when contractor came in, they taught us...”
(SOA manager, Memut).
However, other key informants explained that NGOs op-
erated very independently and did not build the capacity of
the local managers to manage their health services.
“…The problem they found was that working with
NGOs didn’t really help in capacity building for
government officials…” (KII2, Male, MoH).
Cost and sustainability
Financial sustainability of contracting with NGOs was
questioned as the costs of employing NGOs and expatriate
staff were high and mainly covered by donor contributions.
In some districts, managers and health workers were
annoyed with the amount of money being spent on expatri-
ate staff instead of being used for developing local staff.
“If we continue to hire NGO for contracting, MoH does
not have money to pay for that, at the same time staff
at lower level …were not happy because NGO took
much money, so there is little money left for
development” (KII7, Male, Donor).
Private practice
As the base salary of a civil servant in Cambodia is low,
private practice becomes a popular means of income sub-
stitution for public health workers. During the previous
contracting regimes, private practice was strictly banned,
creating some tensions between contractors and local
managers and providers. In some cases, this resulted in
providers leaving their public-sector job. The continue of
contracting under this situation put MOH under pressure
to tackle with this issue. Therefore, SOA is a more “realis-
tic” contracting approach for the system in Cambodia.
“Regulation was too strict… they were not allowed to
work outside [private practice] but they were provided
with incentive. But as usual, incentive was not enough
for a decent living. They need it for life, they need it
for their living, then they sold drugs and opened their
clinic. This was against their contract, and NGO did
not agree to allow staff to open their clinics, they fined
staff 1 or 2 time then send name of staff to PHD, so
some staff just asked to suspend by themselves”
(SOA manager, Peariang).
Key features of the SOA and their implementation
This section is divided into four themes emerging from
the data: selection of districts for SOA; setting and
reaching targets in SOA; monitoring of SOA; and incen-
tives provided through SOA.
Assessment and selection of SOA
For a district to be a SOA, they must apply to the Council
of Ministers and be assessed districts in terms of quality of
health facilities within the district, human resource
management functions, and the availability of a capacity
building agency to support their transition to SOA status.
Some key informants perceived that this process leads to
the selection of only well performing districts.
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“We already select the better facilities to run SOA, so
its nature is already good. In general, if we have 10
students, there must be 2 or 3 outstanding students.
Thus, these outstanding ones already have their
potential. So does SOA” (KII11, Male, Donor)
Setting and reaching targets
Managers and health workers reported several chal-
lenges in achieving the targets that are set. Firstly, man-
agers explained that targets are set using population
data. Some managers reported that the government
assumes that the population in the district is growing
which is not always the case as there is migration in and
out of the district, and this can result in overestimation
of the population and targets being set too high.
“Those migrants were not in the target population, so
the target increased. However, they came temporarily
and went back, so the number decreased, and even
more people moved out, for instance, there were 100
people moved in, but 200 moved out. This is what we
are worried about” (Manager, Memut).
Secondly, some managers explained that the baseline
data on utilization of services is inaccurate – it was too
high and did not reflect the real situation in the district.
They perceived that the targets were set using this base-
line and were therefore unrealistically high. Managers also
explained that the targets should increase every year. This
was perceived as an issue by managers in Memut as they
already have good performance and reach their high tar-
gets and it is very difficult to improve on this.
“… so far our results have been high and they do not
allow us to set them down...they never think that once
we reach the peak, how can we reach more?”
(Manager, Memut).
Thirdly, facility managers and health workers reported
that they compete with other facilities to attract people to
use their services, and therefore reach their targets. Some
managers reported that they were able to do this, by visit-
ing homes in the community to promote use of the facil-
ities and provide services such as consultations, antenatal
examinations, and vaccinations. However, other managers
and health workers found this more difficult as they had
fewer staff and so outreach work would leave the facilities
understaffed, and transport issues.
“My place is facing issue of outpatients, because other
facilities rarely let their clients pass by to use services
here, they have achieved their target already too. While
my facility is in the middle of other facilities, so the
population around this area is the same, but many
health centres absorb the clients.” (Manager, Samrong).
Monitoring of SOA
Irregular monitoring from the central level: Routine moni-
toring of the SOA districts, through visits to the districts
and reviewing reports, should be carried out by the
Service Delivery Monitoring Group (SDMG) from the
central MoH. However, key informants reported that this
monitoring was irregular and provided two main reasons.
SDMG members are unable to assign enough time to this
activity as they have other duties within the MoH; and
they receive very little financial incentives for travelling to
the provinces for monitoring, which is in sharp contrast
to the payments they can receive from private practice in
Phnom Penh. Some key informants also reported the
limited capacity of some SDMG members to monitor the
SOA, which has implications on the quality of monitoring.
This central level monitoring should also include donor or
NGO representatives to provide an “external” perspective.
However, this rarely happened.
“The SDMG monitoring group from ministry is
supposed to conduct monitoring every quarter, but in
fact, they only did twice per year. The SDMG consists
of 4 members, but sometimes only 1 of them went for
monitoring. They have more work, and sometimes they
have job outside [private practice], as the per-diem for
monitoring is $20/day, if they stay in Phnom Penh and
do one operation, they earn $300.” (KII1, Male, MoH).
Provincial Health Department (PHD) lack sufficient
budget to conduct monitoring: The PHD should conduct
quarterly monitoring visits to the SOA districts. However,
there is no specific budget for monitoring the SOA
districts and the general monitoring budget is insuffi-
cient for the frequency of monitoring visits needed.
There are no incentives provided to the PHD man-
agers for monitoring.
“…In general, PHD doesn’t receive any incentive…
Sometimes the PHDs complain… We can see that their
work load has increased and they have to work harder,
but have no incentive” (KII12, Male, Donor).
Monitoring is useful: Some key informants reported
that data can be faked by managers and health care pro-
viders so that they are seen as reaching their targets and
will receive the financial incentives. They stressed the
importance of central and provincial level monitoring
that verifies the data. Managers and staff also explained
that monitoring visits that include going into the com-
munity and verifying that community members actually
Vong et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2018) 18:375 Page 7 of 13
used the services, encourages staff at health centres to
not falsify the facility records.
“In the past, we didn’t have a monitoring system, so the
data provided might not be true or might not be clear.
After the implementation of SOA, we established proper
monitoring system…when our monitoring team went to
inspect ANC, we…took the name list and went to
inspect. In the morning we were in the health centre and
in the afternoon we went to inspect in the village. So
they didn’t dare to make false report” (Manager, Bati)
Monitoring was seen as a way to identify errors and
improve the performance of health care providers, such
as improving punctuality, and providing good quality
care including giving correct treatment according to
guidelines and completing documents. Monitoring can
also help in clarifying individual health worker role and
responsibilities. In the monitoring conducted by the
PHD, progress towards the targets in the contract is
assessed, and any delays are investigated. The PHD then
helps the district managers to find solutions.
“It is very important. If there is no such evaluation
and monitoring, the work cannot be done smoothly
and we cannot work effectively. Sometimes we have
mistakes, when they come, they will give us advice.
Thus, we improve ourselves for better performance…
For instance, now we have mistakes, so what should
we do to be better for next quarter and further… it is
really important” (Manager, Memut).
Incentives from SOA
Managers and health workers perceived that a key bene-
fit of SOA is provision of financial incentives, including
bonuses for health workers. Although the health workers
perceived that the amount of incentive is not great, it
does supplement their salary and incentives from other
schemes, and helps with their livelihood.
“The benefits for staff in health centre is not much, but
it is just... to supplement their daily livelihood, it is quite
a big amount for them” (Health worker, Peariang).
“I’d be happy if SOA continues. Because when having
SOA, they provide us some bonus and additional
incentive for staff, that’s also good that they have
training for us as well” (Health worker, Memut).
Implications of SOA
This section includes the following themes: behaviour of
health workers; quality of care; and utilization of services.
Changes in health workers’ behaviour
Punctuality: SOA contracts include punctuality of health
staff as one of the criteria for allocation of incentives.
Most respondents reported that this has encouraged
staff to arrive and leave work on time and according to
their duty roster. In previous contracting models, punc-
tuality was also good, but this was due to threat of sanc-
tions such as suspension and withdrawal of payment.
Punctuality had improved since the introduction of SOA
in districts where contracting had not been imple-
mented. Some respondents explained that SOA rules are
less strict than in previous contracting, allowing staff to
leave work early or during quiet times so that they can
conduct private practice.
“…SOA is different from non-SOA. For non-SOA, no
matter where it is, if you visit there at 3 or 4pm, you will
see no one there and they only leave the phone number.
Sometimes when people phone staff, they would answer
that they are still on the way. So what is the quality? In
addition, they also have changed their habits and
attitudes and the way they speak to the patients. In the
past, they used to get up at 7 or 8 am, but now they
change – they have to come to work on time, and be on
duty… In the past, they used to come late and treat the
patients badly… Now, they have slogan that, ‘Services
are to serve people.’” (KII4, Male, MoH).
“We have signed the contract with them, so we need to
work even though we have a lot of work at home. We
need to wait until we finish work at the health centre,
then we can do private work at home.” (Facility chief,
Peariang).
Provision of 24 h service: Under SOA, the availability
of 24 h services has improved. In Bati province, facilities
only started providing 24 h services when SOA was in-
troduced. Before this, staff were often absent from the
facilities. Managers and health workers reported that the
strict rules about attendance at the facilities as well as
generating income from user fees promoted staff to be
stay at the facilities.
“There were no permanent 24 hours service here
before, like there were services but there was no staff....
in the past, there was only name, no staff...” (Health
worker, Bati).
Dual practice: All respondents reported that staff
continue to conduct private practice alongside their
government work in SOA districts. Dual practice is not
prohibited in SOA districts, but is allowed as long as the
health worker does it outside of their government work-
ing hours and it does not hamper the achievement of
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the targets set in the SOA contract. However, some
health workers carry out private practice during working
hours, as they are able to agree with their colleagues to
cover their workload. Policy makers explained that the
amount of incentives in SOA is not enough to prevent
staff from conducting private work. Without generating
income from private practice, some specialist staff are
likely to leave their government job.
“If that unit is too strict and does not allow staff to
work in private sectors, they would all quit. Sometimes
we have to do it differently from the contract, which
states that staff have to work 8 hours a day. We even
allow the specialists to work for 4 hours a day in order
to avoid their resignation. For example, if we do not
allow a surgeon to operate in any other clinics besides
the state hospitals, they will all quit work.” (KII3,
Male, MoH).
Quality of care
Managers and health workers in study areas reported
that quality of care had improved following the intro-
duction of SOA. Staff are more careful about how they
assess and treat clients. They explained that they now
carry out more comprehensive assessments of the pa-
tients according to guidelines, clearly record the assess-
ment findings and diagnosis, see one patient at a time,
and only prescribe for patients who attend the facility
and not prescribe for people who remain at home. They
also explained that staff were friendlier to clients, and
showed more kindness and consideration. These im-
provements had started during previous contracting
regimes, as health workers became accustomed to fol-
lowing standards and procedures, but the monitoring
and provision of incentives in SOA have reinforced this
behaviour.
“Before, in consultation we just asked a few things,
and then just wrote the prescription. But when
having SOA, we have to measure blood pressure,
measure body temperature. Later, we note on the
paper. For example, if a patient is having fever, we
just ask them to do blood testing before we can
provide them prescription…before SOA, we just
often did short cut ways [for the treatment]... there
was no monitoring from upper level, there were no
incentives, [we] were just lazy too, that’s why…”
(Health worker, Samrong).
“[diagnosis] has changed, in the past they all tried to
squeeze in…like ten patients tried to get examination
at one time. Today no! One person at a time, with
number order” (Health worker, Bati).
“Staff change the way they talk to patients because
before we had low sense of responsibility..., in short
it was because of little money [incentive]. Our
work is better than before. Having the incentive
from SOA, makes us work better.” (Health worker,
Samrong).
Utilization of services
In 2009, when SOA model was introduced, the average
coverage rate for immunization was similar in the 13 SOA
districts to the average rate in the 10 non-SOA districts.,
However, average coverage rates of deliveries by Skilled
Birth Attendant (SBA), antenatal care and deliveries in a
health facility were higher in the SOA districts than the
non-SOA districts (Fig. 3). Over the period of 2009 to
2012, SOA districts performed better on average than
non-SOA districts on antenatal care and immunization.
In the SOA districts, there was a 10% increase in
deliveries by SBA from 2009 to 2012. In the non-SOA
districts, there was a 10% fall over the same period.
However, an increase of 13% from 2009 to 2012 is evi-
dent if one district (out of 10 non-SOA districts), which
has scarcely plausible data, is excluded. Non-SOA dis-
tricts also realized a much greater increase in health
facility deliveries than SOA districts.
Managers and health workers reported that since
the introduction of SOA, utilization of services has
increased. The major reasons for these increases are
improved public trust in services provided and the
availability of 24 h services (Table 4).
Fig. 3 Average service coverage in SOA and non-SOA districts (2009–2012)
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“They just know that our staff work here regularly so
that they come to use services here...because when they
come they always meet our staff so they just like to
come more. But before when they came, they didn’t
meet our staff so they didn’t like to come any more”
(Health worker, Samrong).
Managers and health workers also reported increases
in service use by the poor. They identified three main
reasons for these increases: Health Equity Funds (HEF),
a funding mechanism that gives vulnerable and poor
populations access to health services, are available in all
SOA districts; SOA contracts specify quality of care in-
cluding communication with clients and this has encour-
aged staff to behave well towards all clients irrespective
of socio-economic status; and facilities are open 24 h, so
that the poor can access services at any time.
Discussion
Summary of key findings
This paper explores the challenges in implementing the
SOA approach, the effects on service delivery and identi-
fies any lessons learned from implementation to inform
next steps. There are several key findings from this
study. There are issues with the capacity and funding for
monitoring the SOA, as well as questions marks about
the reliability of the data. Some facilities face challenges
in achieving the targets set in their contracts. There are
some positive effects on staff behaviour which include
being more punctual at facility, being on call for 24 h
service, improved communication with clients, and per-
ceived better quality of care, promoted through adher-
ence to work regulations stipulated in the contracts and
provision of incentives. Compared to former contracting
schemes, dual practice has increased as there is some
flexibility in enforcing the contract regulations in SOA.
Utilization of services has increased according to the
managers and health workers largely because of in-
creased community trust in health facilities and services
being provided throughout the 24 h period. Reported in-
creased service utilisation by the poor was attributed to
the HEF being available in all SOA districts and im-
proved attitudes of health workers. However, the sec-
ondary data provide a different picture about utilisation
of services. Emerging from the findings are three import-
ant areas for discussion: achieving targets and the quality
of data; issues with monitoring; and quality of care.
Achieving targets and the quality of data
Some facilities found it difficult to achieve the targets set
in the contracts. The findings suggest several issues. The
population data used to calculate the targets may be in-
accurate. This is not unique to the Cambodian context,
as many countries face challenges in acquiring accurate
population data [25]. The service utilization data used
as baseline for targets are also suspected to be in-
accurate. Too high baseline figures for service
utilization, make it difficult for increases to be dem-
onstrated. Definition of denominators and a lack of
complete data for indicators were similar challenges
identified in a recent study [19].
This raises the issue of the quality of the data for not
only baseline assessment and target setting but also moni-
toring performance and assessing the impact of SOA on
service utilization. The secondary data suggests SOA
districts performed better than non-SOA districts for ante-
natal care and immunisation. However, the opposite was
true for health facility deliveries and (probably) also for
SBA deliveries. There are several difficulties in interpreting
the secondary data. The selection bias of districts as dis-
tricts were selected for SOA as they were already well-
performing. There are more resources available to SOA
districts than to non-SOA districts. Other interventions
apart from the contracting process have been implemented
in the provinces such as the Health Equity Fund, the
Government Midwifery Scheme, the Reproductive Health
Voucher Scheme and the Community Base Health Insur-
ance Scheme. Applying uniform national or provincial ra-
tios to district populations to estimate specific populations
e.g. the number of pregnant women or children under
1 year can be problematic. If the actual figures are greater
than the assumed figure, then the real coverage rate may
be lower. There were also many examples of scarcely be-
lievable values or changes in the data. For example, in one
district the rate of SBA delivery fell from 88 to 33% over 3
years. Although possible reasons for this may also lie in
new facilities drawing clients away from this district.
Creating competition amongst health care facilities can
drive increases in utilization and quality of care [26]. Facil-
ities work hard to attract people to use their services
Table 4 Reasons for increases in service utilization in SOA
districts
Key informants Health managers and providers
Public have more trust in
the SOA facilities
Improved public trust in health
facilities – provide better quality
of care (improved staff attitude
and better treatment)
Facilities are now open for
24 h per day
Staff being available 24 h
per day
Staff are more punctual and
stay at facilities because of
incentives attached to punctuality
and availability of services
Outreach programmes have
increased community awareness
of the availability of and need
for services
Staff have received more training
since being in SOA and this has
improved the services that they
deliver
Clear contracts with targets for
provision of services, incentives
and monitoring in the SOA
scheme
Low service fees because of
HEF and CBHI
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through improved quality of care and outreach work. How-
ever, some facility managers and health workers found this
difficult. Reluctance to compete with their colleagues in
other facilities for clients, inability or unwillingness to in-
crease outreach work and improve quality of care, or sheer
overload of work may be factors influencing their approach
to competition. Support from OD and PHD managers is
needed to identify how facilities can attract more clients
within their context.
Issues with monitoring
Monitoring the performance of the health services is an
important aspect of contract management [5]. However,
in this study there are weaknesses in monitoring from
central and provincial level health departments – infre-
quent visits, limited capacity to conduct thorough moni-
toring, and inadequate external review. These are not new
findings, but have continued throughout the implementa-
tion of the SOA: monitoring had not been included or
budgeted for in their annual operation plans; a lack of
clarity in roles and responsibilities of the contracting par-
ties; and the overlapping roles of the SOA and monitoring
groups (World Bank: Cambodia's rural health markets.
Human Development Unit & East Asia and Pacific
Region: World Bank, unpublished; [20]). There are several
reasons behind the issues of monitoring. Monitoring is
not incentivized or linked with performance contract es-
pecially the contract between MOH and PHD, making
them reluctant to perform their monitoring roles. This re-
luctance is aggravated as other staff in the OD and health
care workers receive incentives from the SOA scheme.
One other revolves around the perceived usefulness of
monitoring: managers could only withhold incentives
when performance is poor and some staff may be willing
to go without them as they were able to generate income
elsewhere. Although one of the driving forces for introdu-
cing the SOA was national and local ownership of the
health system, this may have not trickled down to the dis-
trict level, with the perception that the central level still
directs and makes decision, including with monitoring.
Monitoring activities should be included in the annual
operation plan so that they have sufficient budget and are
prioritized (World Bank: Cambodia's rural health markets.
Human Development Unit & East Asia and Pacific
Region: World Bank, unpublished). Independent perform-
ance monitoring has been recommended by a recent study
in Cambodia (World Bank: Cambodia's rural health mar-
kets. Human Development Unit & East Asia and Pacific
Region: World Bank, unpublished). This study also sug-
gests that SOA monitoring could be improved through
the consistent use of a third party.
Weak monitoring is not exclusive to the Cambodian
context. There is evidence from other countries that
there is weak capacity of the state in monitoring the
performance of contracting [5]. Investment in the devel-
opment of robust monitoring mechanisms in terms of
capacity to monitor and adequate funding is vital if
contracting is to be successful in improving access,
utilization and quality of services.
Quality of care and dual practice
The study suggests that within the SOA approach, there is
some enforcement of regulations such as wearing uniform,
following guidelines and providing 24 h services. There is
also evidence of some flexibility in working arrangements,
allowing for less strict working hours, and some private
practice. Indeed, relaxation of the ban on private practice
was seen as one of the driving forces behind the introduc-
tion of SOA. This may be a pragmatic solution followed
by managers who consider that the government salary and
financial incentives (including the SOA incentive) are not
enough to attract and retain staff, and that private practice
can generate important income. There is some debate in
the literature about the implications of dual practice on
service coverage. There is concern that it can reduce qual-
ity of care and accessibility to users of the public system
[27]. Others suggest that opportunities for public sector
health workers to practice in the private sector keeps them
in the public sector, who would otherwise migrate
overseas, move into full time private practice or into other
professions [28]. The implications of dual practice are
context specific, dependent on the labour market, regula-
tory authority, and demand for services [29]. In our study
setting there are important issues with allowing dual prac-
tice to consider. Service users may have to wait for the
health workers to arrive at the health facility, causing de-
lays in receiving treatment or referral, which could poten-
tially be life threatening. User dissatisfaction, reduced
willingness to use the facility again or promote usage of
services by their family or community are all repercussions
of delays in being seen at health facilities. In addition, dual
practice raises equity issues. Poor patients are more likely
to use public facilities where the Health Equity Fund will
support their costs, and so they are the ones who will suf-
fer most from the delays in receiving treatment.
But how do you deal with dual practice? This is challen-
ging as it is a well-established practice embedded in health
organizations. There are a number of approaches to take:
a review of health worker salary and incentives across the
cadres in order to understand the drivers of health worker
behavior - income and the perception of a fair distribution
of incentives is associated with higher job motivation
scores [30]; developing a holistic incentive package that
includes non-financial incentives such as preferential
access to training, provision of accommodation, clinical
mentoring, and improved transport and working condi-
tions [31]; together with building on the intrinsic motiv-
ation of staff to serve their community [30].
Vong et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2018) 18:375 Page 11 of 13
The study has several limitations. We did not include
user perspectives on changes in utilization and quality of
services. Although we have perceptions on changes in
quality of care from health workers and managers, we did
not focus on the effects of SOA on quality of care. A study
of quality of care using both quantitative and qualitative
methodology would be important. We did not investigate
in-depth the issues of dual practice in the current study.
Further study should focus on effects of dual practice and
its implications on the performance based contracting. We
were unable to systematically identify the role of contract-
ing as such in the observed changes. There are problems
with attribution with regard to the operation of the Health
Equity Fund in all SOA districts and the fact that SOA dis-
tricts received greater funding than non-SOA ones.
Conclusion
Over the last 8 years, the SOA model of contracting has
been implemented in 36 provincial hospitals and health dis-
tricts in Cambodia. The SOA model can improve health
worker performance: health workers adhere to work regula-
tions and are rewarded with incentives as specified in the
contracts in SOA. However, managing contracts in SOA is
a complex process requiring capacity in planning and moni-
toring contracts at different levels in the health system. Ser-
vice delivery will be undermined if effective performance
management is not established nor applied. If the SOA con-
tracting system is to continue, then improvements in the
implementation of SOA are needed: improved monitoring
by the central and provincial levels; developing incentive
schemes that tackle the issues of dual practice; and securing
trustworthy baseline data for performance indicators.
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